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When Are ‘Female’ Occupations Paying More?




We compare the importance of occupational gender segregation for the gender wage gap in
East and West Germany in 1995 using a sampleof social-security wage records of full-time work-
ers. East Germany, which features a somewhat higher degree of occupational segregation, has a
gender wage gap on the order of one …fth of the West German gap. Segregation is not related
to the West German wage gap, but in East Germany, wages of both men and women are higher
in predominantly female occupations. East German female employees apparently have better
observable and unobservable characteristics than their male colleagues. These …ndings are in
contrast to a large U.S. literature, but are consistent with the imposition of high wage levels
in East Germany at the outset of reforms and the selection of only high-skill women into em-
ployment. Finally, conditioning on unobservable labor quality di¤erences using the longitudinal
dimension of the data, there is a negligible impact of segregation in both parts of Germany.
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One of the most clearly established facts in the literature on the gender wage gap is that there are
large and persistent di¤erences in the share of female workers across occupations and that wages of
both men and women decrease with the presence of females in their occupation. Concentration of
women in low paying occupations is therefore a major source of the gender wage gap.
There are three main possible explanations for why ‘female’ occupations pay less. First, women
may face discriminatory hiring, …ring, and promotion practices, which prevent them from working
in high-wage occupations. Second, ‘female’ occupations may o¤er costly non-wage characteristics
(e.g., ‡exibility of work hours); women are then more likely to accept lower wages because they
prefer such occupational attributes. Third, workers employed in ‘female’ occupations may have
lower skills (both observed and/or unobserved).
Researchers analyzing the relationship between individual wages and the ‘femaleness’ of occu-
pations have therefore recently taken into account not only observed productive characteristics of
workers, but also occupational attributes and unmeasured worker skills and occupational prefer-
ences. In the U.S. and Canada, controlling for these additional factors substantially reduces the
wage penalty to female jobs (Macpherson and Hirsh, 1995; Baker and Fortin, 2001).
Another line of research uses cross-country di¤erences in labor-market institutions and wage
structures to study the sources of the gender wage gap (Blau and Kahn, 2003) and the penalty to
working in predominantly female occupations (Baker and Fortin, 1999). In this paper, we extend
the cross-country literature by investigating the e¤ect of occupational gender composition on wages
in East and West Germany in 1995. West Germany represents a regulated European labor market
with a stable, compressed wage structure and low female employment rates. On the other hand,
East Germany has been subject to the most radical pro-market reform among all post-communist
economies as the German uni…cation brought about instant implementation of western-style labor
market institutions. The two parts of Germany therefore o¤er three interesting comparisons. First,
1one can contrast the West German results to …ndings available for the U.S.1 Second, the East-
West German comparison can help distinguish the e¤ect of institutions from those of di¤erent
labor market histories. Third, the East German evidence can be compared to …ndings from other
transition economies in order to shed light on the e¤ects of radical pro-market reforms.2
The existing research on occupational gender composition and wages in post-communist coun-
tries …nds that occupational segregation is an important source of the overall gender wage gap (see
Ogloblin, 1999, for evidence on Russia, and Jurajda, 2003, for results from the Czech and Slovak
Republics). However, East Germany o¤ers a particularly interesting case for study because the
German uni…cation led to the imposition of high wage levels early on in the transition process. En-
terprise restructuring was radical as employment dropped by 35% between 1989 and 1992 (Burda
and Hunt, 2001). This contrasts with a more gradual reform process in other transition coun-
tries, where wages decreased early on in transition. These di¤erent reform paths may have a¤ected
women di¤erently. While the gender wage gap has been stable or growing in most post-communist
countries (Newell and Reilly, 2000; Brainerd, 2000), the East German gap has decreased since uni…-
cation. Hunt (2002) suggests that this has been in large part due to low-earning women selectively
dropping out of the labor force. However, no evidence exists on the extent and the wage e¤ects
of gender segregation in East Germany. Yet, such evidence would be important for evaluating the
early introduction of western-type anti-discrimination policies in East Germany, which occurred as
part of the German uni…cation.3
In this paper, we therefore …ll the gap in the empirical literature by …rst asking whether East
German occupations are relatively more or less segregated in terms of gender compared to those
in West Germany. Second, we provide descriptive evidence on pay di¤erences between men and
1See Dolado et al. (2002) for a comparison of the U.S. and European female employment rates and Freeman and
Schettkat (2000) for a study of US-German di¤erences in wage dispersion.
2See Burda and Hunt (2001) or Riphahn et al. (2001) for detailed analyses of East German reforms.
3German law provides the typical “western” set of anti-discrimination clauses. Apart from the constitutional
guarantee of equal rights, there are clauses requiring equal pay and prohibiting unequal hiring, …ring and promotion
practices (that is prohibiting discriminatory segregation). There have been a variety of court cases and respective
rulings enforcing these laws.
2women. Third, we investigate the e¤ects of workplace segregation on the gender wage gap in both
parts of Germany.
We employ a large representative administrative sample of workers from 1995 — the so called
IAB employment subsample, which consists of wage records drawn from the German Social Security
database. Due to a lack of information on hours worked we focus on full-time workers. In a subset
of our analysis, we form a matched employer-employee data set, which enables the study of within-
establishment wage di¤erences. The wage structure is described using logarithmic wage regressions
conditioning on worker and …rm characteristics as well as on the fraction of women within a given
occupation. We focus on the cross-sectional relationship between wages and segregation, but we also
attempt to come closer to a causal e¤ect of segregation on wages by conditioning on unobservable
worker skills and occupational preferences. Speci…cally, we use a panel of workers employed in 1992
and 1995, the earliest and latest years for which the (East German) data are available, to remove
all time-constant worker characteristics. The estimated coe¢cients are then used together with the
mean di¤erences in explanatory variables by gender to quantify the part of the wage gap explained
by gender segregation.
Our analysis uncovers intriguing East-West di¤erences. East Germany, which features a some-
what higher degree of occupational segregation, has a much smaller gender wage gap. The West
German wage gap is substantial, both across all workers and within jobs (occupation-…rm cells),
but there is almost no di¤erence between the median wages of East German full-time male and
female workers. Yet, there are signi…cant East German gender wage gaps within jobs. Our regres-
sion analysis reconciles these pieces of descriptive evidence: We …nd little support for the existence
of a wage penalty to ‘female’ jobs in West Germany. Occupational segregation therefore does not
explain the higher wage gap in West Germany. The signi…cant within-job wage gaps in East Ger-
many do not appear at the aggregate level because more ‘female’ occupations actually o¤er higher
wages, in striking contrast to …ndings from the U.S. as well as from transition countries. We rely on
3indirect evidence, both within- and cross-country, to o¤er an explanation for this arresting …nding;
the explanation is related to the radical reform path of East Germany. Finally, conditioning on
unobservable labor quality, the wage impact of gender segregation is small in both parts of Germany.
2. Background
2.1. Occupational Gender Segregation and Wage Gap
Occupational segregation is the subject of extensive research. It is more pronounced in the EU
countries compared to the U.S. for low-educated workers (Dolado et al., 2002). There is widespread
evidence that wages of both male and female workers are lower when they are employed in predom-
inantly female occupations; see Kilingsworth (1990), Groshen (1991) or Bayard et al. (in press) for
U.S. evidence, and Baker and Fortin (2001) for results from Canada. While occupational segre-
gation is often attributed to discriminatory employer practices, Filer (1986) and Macpherson and
Hirsh (1995) are among the researchers who suggest that it is in large part due to gender di¤erences
in preferences for occupational characteristics or to sorting on unobserved labor quality.4
The suggested mechanisms giving rise to the observed negative correlations between the female
share of an occupation’s workforce and the respective wages of men and women often di¤er by gen-
der. For example, if women are discouraged from entering high-wage occupations by discriminatory
barriers, then only women with very high (possibly unobservable) labor quality will be able to enter
the typically ‘male’ occupations. The fraction of female workforce then becomes an index of labor
quality and only low-quality men will sort themselves into the more ‘female’ occupations.
Another strand of the literature relies on cross-country research design to analyze the importance
of labor market institutions for employment patterns by gender (Bertola, et. al, 2002), the gender
wage gap (Blau and Kahn, 2003) or the occupational gender segregation (Baker and Fortin, 1999).
Comparing the United States and Canada, Baker and Fortin (1999) …nd the wage penalty to jobs
principally employing female workers to be larger in the U.S. and link this …nding to a low U.S.
4For a theoretical model where workers of complementary skills are grouped together see Kremer (1993).
4female unionization rate and low wages in certain public-goods-sector jobs. However, there are no
detailed studies comparing occupational segregation wage e¤ects in the regulated European labor
markets to those found in the Anglo-Saxon economies.
2.2. Female Wages in Transition
There is a wealth of research analyzing the evolution of the gender wage gap during early pro-
market reforms when wage dispersion increased dramatically and when labor force participation
rates decreased from the arti…cially high levels of the communist era.5 While the gender wage
gap has been quite stable in many transition countries (Newell and Reilly, 2000), it has dropped
by about 10 percentage points in East Germany. Hunt (2002) attributes much of this decrease to
low-earning women selectively dropping out of the labor force.
Today, the East German female employment ratio is comparable to that of West Germany, but
the level of its female labor-force participation still remains relatively high.6 This has been explained
by Bonin and Euwals (2002) as being largely due to the di¤erent pro-participation characteristics
of the Eastern female workforce, inherited from the communist times of female labor-market eman-
cipation.
Out of the many gender wage gap studies of transition economies, only two pay close attention
to the issue of gender segregation. Ogloblin (1999) analyzes the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring
Survey from 1994-1996 and …nds that the gender pay gap cannot be explained by gender di¤erences
in education and experience. However, additional conditioning on industry and …rm ownership
dummies as well as on a class of occupational dummies capturing overwhelmingly “male” and “fe-
male” occupations accounts for over 80% of the Russian wage gap. In contrast, Jurajda (2003) uses
large matched employer-employee data covering medium- and large-…rm Czech and Slovak employ-
5See, e.g., Brainerd (1998) for Russia or Jolli¤e (2001) for Bulgaria. Ogloblin (1999) and Brainerd (2000) provide
an analysis of the institutional background to gender under communism.
6Using the 1995 Microcensus data, the female (male) employment ratio is 0.36 (0.53) in West Germany and 0.38
(0.51) in East Germany. The correspondingfemale (male) labor force participation rate is 0.39(0.58) in West Germany
and 0.48 (0.57) in East Germany.
5ment in 1998 to suggest that in Central Europe segregation of women into low-paying occupations
and …rms is responsible for only about one third of the total wage gap.
3. Data
The data we use consist of a one-percent random sample from the German Social Security records,
perhaps better known as the IAB employment subsample.7 The West German data is available
from 1975 until 1995 while the East German …le spans the 1992-1995 period. The original data
consists of various types of social security records (noti…cations) including the start and end of
employment spells. The employment (and wage) information is also updated at the end of each
year. The 1995 end-of-year cross-section of employees forms the basis for our analysis. In a subset
of our analysis, we also use the panel of workers employed in both 1992 and 1995.
German social security reporting covers virtually all of its enterprise employment. Only civil
servants and self-employed workers are excluded from contributions (and the IAB sample).8 As of
1995, the social security records cover almost 80 percent of total West German employment and
over 86 percent of East German employment.
Besides a number of personal and …rm characteristics, including the workers’ occupation, the
data also provide average gross daily wages for each corresponding employment noti…cation. Having
only daily wage rates, as opposed to hourly rates, is a major weakness of our study. It may lead
us to confound gender di¤erences in hours worked with true wage-rate di¤erentiation; hence, we
focus our analysis on full-time employment in order to minimize work time di¤erences.9 While
wages of part-timers remain outside the scope of our analysis, it is important to acknowledge the
potential gender wage discrimination operating through lower wages of typically female part-timers
7See Bender et al. (2000) for a detailed data description. The data are anonymized and distributed through
the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (IAB), the German Institute for
Employment Research.
8Even though public servants are not included in the IAB data, 10 to 15 percent of social-security employees work
in state institutions or non-governmental organizations in health, public administration or education sectors.
9We check for the gender di¤erences in hours worked using the German Socio-Economic Panel in Section 4.2.
6in Germany.10
The wage data is censored from above (top coded), which a¤ects approximately 10 (4) percent
of the wage records in West (East) Germany for both years. Hence, our descriptive analysis focuses
on median wage gaps and we also check for sensitivity to top-coding in our regression analysis. On
the other hand, the wage information in the IAB data has an important advantage in that the wage
de…nition is the same across all time periods and …rms. The social security administration performs
various plausibility checks on the wage data and issues sanctions for misreporting, thereby ensuring
high accuracy. The use of administrative records minimizes reporting errors for other variables as
well.
The data have another important advantage: Sampling one percent of all social security no-
ti…cations results in an extensive database. In 1995 the IAB sample includes over 140 thousand
end-of-year employment records in West Germany and over 40 thousand such records in East Ger-
many.11 The large scale of the data allows us to precisely estimate the gender composition of
occupations and to create a matched employer-employee sub-sample.12 Having available several
workers from the same …rm allows us to explore the extent of the gender wage gap within occupa-
tions within …rms. Of course, given that we work with a random sample of workers, we can only
match several workers to their employer for large …rms.
The estimation-ready data was selected as follows: We start with all end-of-year employment
noti…cations—a simple cross-section of social-security employment for 1995. From this data we omit
records for non-Germans, home and part-time workers, and records with missing wage information
as well as those noti…cations for full-time employment with daily wages below 60 German Marks
10Wolf (2002) shows that hourly wages of West German part-time female workers are lower than wages of women
working full time. Since only few male worker are part-timers, this issue is important for overall gender pay di¤erences.
In a recent ruling, the German supreme court stated the right for equal hourly payment between part-time and full-
time employment and also made explicit that a company (in this case the German Post AG) used lower payment of
its part-time employees as an indirect way of discriminatingagainst its female workers (BVERFG 1. Senat 2. kammer
19.05.1999. 1 BvR 263/98).
11The East-West distinction in the IAB data is based on current residence.
12We form the matches using the unique establishment number issued by the German Employment Service.
7(DM).13 (A similar procedure was applied to obtain the 1992 sample which is used together with
the 1995 data in our longitudinal analysis.) The 1995 data descriptive characteristics are presented
in the …rst two columns of the top panel of Table 1. We have available over 180 thousand workers
from almost 110 thousand …rms. While the average age of full-time social-security employees is
comparable across the two parts of Germany, the share of female workers is much higher in East
Germany, re‡ecting in part the higher propensity of males to be self-employed there (see, e.g., Hunt,
2002). East German employees also have higher educational levels while wages are obviously higher
in the West.
Next, we check whether the IAB sample is consistent with other data sources on the German
labor market. Most analyses of the German wage structure rely on the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP), a relatively small, but rich longitudinal household survey. In the next two columns
of Table 1, we therefore compare the basic characteristics of the IAB sample to those of a GSOEP
sub-sample selected to mimic the nature of the IAB data.14 Comparing the IAB and GSOEP pairs of
columns in Table 1 shows that the two sub-samples have a very similar demographic structure. The
main di¤erence is in the level of wages, which are higher based on the GSOEP survey responses.15
On the other hand, we note that the East-West German median wage ratio is the same in both
samples at 0.71. We conclude that our IAB subsample is comparable to the relevant subsample of
the GSOEP.
Finally, we note that the Social Security administration uses a three-digit occupational classi…-
cation. We have available a total of 274 detailed occupation classes.16 Inspection of the occupations’
13Our goal is to minimize the possibility of including a part-time (female) worker in our …nal sample. The choice
of the 60DM cuto¤ is consistent with the general level of (industry-speci…c) minimum wages in Germany.
14We start with the basic GSOEP sample and drop self-employed, civil servants as well as part-time and very-low-
wage workers. We apply the cross-sectional GSOEP weights to generate the reported sample characteristics.
15The GSOEP asks respondents about their gross salary from the previous month (earnings before deductions for
tax and social security, including overtime payments, but excluding bonuses). To roughly approximate the daily wage,
we divide this number by 20. We are mainly interested in comparing not the wage level, but the gender gaps in daily
wages across the two datasets, IAB and GSOEP; see Section 4.2.
16These classes do not correspond to the ISCO codes of the International Labor Organization. For use of other-
than-ISCO 3-digit occupational schemes see, e.g., Macpherson and Hirsh (1995).
8size reveals the presence of one outlier: The class of skilled o¢ce clerks covers over 12 percent of
workers in both East and West Germany and so it forms the largest occupation in the data.17 We
want to minimize the possibility of meaningful di¤erences in the content of this large occupation
and so we interact this occupation with the 15-branch industry indicator (see, e.g., Dolado et al.,
2002, for a similar approach).
4. Analysis
4.1. Descriptive Evidence on Segregation
What are the main features of female employment in our two economies? First, the share of women
out of total full-time social-security employment is higher in East Germany at 39 percent compared
to 33 percent in West Germany in 1995 (Table 1), likely re‡ecting the higher male propensity to
enter self-employment in the early transition period. A view of occupational segregation by gender
is o¤ered in the two graphs of Figure 4.1, where the worker distribution of the share of females
within the 274 IAB occupation classes is plotted for both parts of Germany in 1995. For example,
in West Germany almost 30% of all full-time social-security employees work in 3-digit occupations
that are entirely sta¤ed by men. The overall pattern of occupational segregation is quite similar
across the two parts of Germany. Indeed, the East-West correlation of the share of females at the
3-digit occupation level is high at 0.91, suggesting strong similarity in the gender composition of
occupational employment, despite the di¤erent history (of labor market practices).
A summarizing measure of occupational gender segregation typically used in the literature is







where the subscript i denotes occupation, mi is the proportion of males employed in occupation
17The second largest occupational class covers less than 4% of all workers in both East and West Germany; the rest
of the size distribution is continuous. The skilled o¢ce clerks category, Bürofachkräfte in German, includes secretaries



































































































































































Figure 4.1: Occupational Gender Segregation in Germany in 1995
i and fi is the corresponding fraction of females. The index can be interpreted as re‡ecting the
sum of worker reallocation required to equalize the gender composition of occupations. In 1995, the
index takes on the value of 61 percent in West Germany and 65 percent in East Germany, signaling
somewhat higher occupational gender segregation there.
In Table 2, we calculate the Duncan index for twelve demographic groups de…ned by age and
education in both parts of Germany. We only report the East-West comparison for groups which
form over 2 percent of employment in at least one part of Germany. The group-speci…c statistics
suggest that occupational gender segregation is much more pronounced in the East as compared to
the West for young workers. On the other hand, those in the large group of employees over 44 years
of age with an apprenticeship degree have virtually identical segregation index and the small group
of older Eastern workers with a college degree is much less segregated across occupations compared
to their Western colleagues. These results suggest that we should investigate the wage-segregation
relationship not only for the whole sample of German workers, but also with particular focus on
young workers in East Germany.
104.2. Descriptive Evidence on the Wage Gap
What is the size of the gender wage gap for full-time social-security employees on the post-uni…cation
labor market? We represent the gap using the wage disadvantage of women de…ned as 1¡ wf=wm;
where wm stands for the median male wage and wf is the corresponding female wage. In 1995, the
median unconditional wage gap, expressed in percentage points, is 22 in West Germany but it is -1
in East Germany (see the second panel of Table 1). We also estimate the mean gender wage gaps,
which are larger at 30 percent in West Germany and 6.2 percent in East Germany.18
These are striking …ndings. The Eastern gap is remarkably low: It is only about one …fth the
size of the Western gap using the mean wage comparison. Even more striking is the …nding based
on median wages: A typical East-German full-time female employee is paid slightly more than her
male counterpart.
These results call for comparison. We use the 1995 GSOEP data and select a sub-sample
mimicking the composition of our IAB data. The resulting wage gaps are reported in the bottom
panel of Table 1.19 Using the GSOEP self-reported wage measure, we replicate the IAB median
wage gap in West Germany and we also con…rm that the East German wage gap is very small. The
remaining di¤erence of about 4 percentage points in our estimate of the East German median wage
gap may be due to sampling error as the East German restricted GSOEP sample consists of only
1425 workers. Further, the mean wage gap in our GSOEP sub-sample is 26% in West Germany and
7% in East Germany, quite close to our IAB approximate mean wage gaps. Given the large size
and the administrative nature of the wage information in the IAB sample, we feel con…dent that
18The mean is estimated as E[w] = Pr(w < w
c)E[wjw < w
c] + Pr(w ¸ w
c)w
c; where w
c is the top-coded wage
value.
19The IAB wage measure includes bonuses and fringe bene…ts, while these are excluded from the GSOEP wage
de…nition. Both the IAB and GSOEP wages we use in our calculations are not corrected for gender di¤erences in
hours worked. Information on hours worked is available in GSOEP. Constraining the GSOEP sample to mimic the
IAB employment (full-time workers, no civil servants or self-employed) and dropping observations with weekly hours
below 30 or above 60, gender di¤erences in contractual (actual) hours are in the order of 1 (5) percent in both East
and West Germany in both 1992 and 1995. We conclude that (i) the East German wage-rate gap may be even
more negative than we report, and (ii) di¤erences in hours worked are unlikely to a¤ect our East-West comparison.
Nevertheless, the size of the bias is unclear as Pannenberg (2002) reports that a large fraction of overtime hours is
unpaid in West Germany.
11our results are informative about the wage gap of full-time German social-security workers.
It is natural to ask whether the lack of median wage di¤erences in East Germany corresponds
to a perfectly equalized wage setting in which men and women working on the same job are paid
equally. A unique advantage of the IAB data is that it allows one to answer this question directly.
Using the matched employer employee sub-sample (see Section 3) we can ask about pay di¤erences
between men and women working in the same detailed occupation in the same …rm—in the same
job. The bottom panel of Table 1 compares the overall wage gaps to those based on within-job
comparisons. Each entry is the percentage wage disadvantage for females averaged across all job
cells where we could match at least one male and one female worker, that is predominantly in large
…rms. The results imply that median wages of such male and female co-workers di¤er by about 7
percent in East Germany and by about 15 percent in West Germany.20
These are remarkably large within-job wage gaps, especially in the context of the overall di¤er-
ences in male and female wages, even though these are based on a broader sample of all workers
and …rms. In West Germany, there is a wage gap of almost one sixth among very similar workers of
di¤erent gender. In part, the job-cell wage gap may be caused by di¤erences in hours worked, but
its extent calls for further investigation of potential violations of the equal pay act. The size of the
within-job wage gap also suggests that occupational segregation may not be an important source of
the relatively large West German overall wage gap. In East Germany, our results thus far suggest
the coexistence of a signi…cant gender wage gap within jobs with an almost fully equalized overall
wage. A leading potential explanation for such a pattern of wage gaps is that ‘female’ occupations
pay more. We explore this hypothesis below.
20The average wage gaps are only slightly higher than the median wage gaps. The averages are taken across all
observed job-cell wage-gap observations. Weighting by the size of each observed worker group makes no material
di¤erence. The median wage gaps are not sensitive to constraining the analysis to job cells with at least 3 men and
3 women.
124.3. Accounting for the Wage Gap
In this section, we account for the sources of the observed wage gaps using logarithmic wage regres-
sions. Speci…cally, we ask about the explanatory power of (i) worker and …rm characteristics, and
(ii) occupational segregation. Following the literature (e.g., Groshen, 1991; Macpherson and Hirsh,
1995; or Bayard et al., in press), we capture the e¤ect of gender segregation on wages by condition-
ing on the ‘femaleness’ of occupations. ‘Femaleness’ is measured by the percent of females (P) in
a given group of employees.21 We therefore estimate logarithmic Least Squares wage regressions of
the following form separately for each gender and part of Germany:
lnwij = X
0
ijﬂ + Pj￿ + ·j + †ij; with i = 1;:::Nj; and j = 1;:::;J: (1)
Here, wij denotes the daily wage of the i-th worker in the j-th occupation, Xij represents the
observed worker and …rm characteristics, Pj is the fraction of female employment in j-th occupation,
·j captures the occupation-speci…c unobservable attributes, †ij includes the unobserved worker-
speci…c skills, J denotes the total number of occupations, and Nj is the number of workers in the
sample employed in the j-th occupation.
Equation 1 highlights two important sources of estimation problems. Unfortunately, we are
not able to fully control for the …rst unobservable, the occupation-speci…c attributes ·j, which
may lead to an upward bias in ￿ if women prefer occupations which o¤er costly attributes (e.g.,
‡exible working hours or lack of physical-strength demands). Secondly, sorting of workers into
occupations based on unobserved labor quality provides the basis for an important hypothesis in
the occupational segregation literature (see Section 2.1). If the occupational averages of worker
unobserved skills (†ij) are correlated with the ‘femaleness’ of occupations (Pj), this would again
lead to a biased estimate of ￿: One can remove the time-constant unobservable worker skills by
21We estimate the occupation-speci…c fraction of female workers from within our data. Given the cross-sectional
size of the data, this results in precise estimates of occupations’ ‘femaleness.’ Also, recall that we use the IAB 3-digit
occupational classi…cation with 274 distinct groups of workers. Having a detailed categorization of occupations is
important for minimizing the extent of measurement error (bias) to the extent that there are meaningful di¤erences
in the content of occupations within broad occupational categories.
13di¤erentiating between observations for the same worker from two time periods. We follow this
strategy below, but …rst, we present a set of traditional cross-sectional estimates.
The possibility of correlated unobservables within occupations also a¤ects statistical inference
in our cross-sectional estimation. To provide a conservative basis for inference, we therefore capture
occupation-level clustering of unobservables using a panel-data version of the Huber/White variance
estimator:






















); b †j = ln wj ¡ Zjb – is the column vector of estimated error terms for workers
in the j-th occupation, and where Zj = (Xj;Pj) is the matrix of regressors rearranged along the
occupational dimension.
4.3.1. Standard Explanations
The least-squares regression estimates for West and East Germany are presented in Tables 3a and
3b respectively. Columns (1) and (3) list standard speci…cations conditioning on both worker and
…rm characteristics but not on occupational segregation measures. Given the absence of actual labor
market experience in the data, we choose to include among the regressors the number of children
and a marriage indicator together with a quadratic in age. By doing so, we aim to control for the
wage e¤ects of (past) maternity leaves to the extent allowed by the data. We also condition on the
type of employer by including a set of industry and …rm-size dummies. The estimates suggest very
similar returns to education across both economies and genders as well as a strong similarity in the
estimated industry wage structures.
Next, we use the estimated coe¢cients to ask about the sources of the gender wage gaps in
Germany using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. The approach focuses on …rst moments of
wages, relying on the fact that …tted regressions pass through sample means (Oaxaca, 1973). A
14general form of the mean wage decomposition is as follows:
lnwm ¡ lnwf = (Xm ¡ Xf)
0e ﬂ + [Xm
0
(c ﬂm ¡ e ﬂ) + Xf
0
(e ﬂ ¡ c ﬂf)]; (3)
where f denotes females and m denotes males, lnws is the gender-speci…c mean of the natural
logarithm of hourly wage, Xs represents the respective vectors of mean values of explanatory vari-
ables for men and women with s 2 ff;mg. Finally, c ﬂm and c ﬂf are the corresponding vectors
of estimated coe¢cients from gender-speci…c wage regressions and e ﬂ represents a counter-factual
non-discriminatory wage structure. The …rst term on the right hand side of equation 3 represents
that part of the total logarithmic wage di¤erence which stems from the di¤erence in average ob-
served productive characteristics across gender. The second term originates in the di¤erences in
gender-speci…c coe¢cients from the non-discriminatory wage structure and is often interpreted as
providing an upper limit on potential wage discrimination. There are a number of variants of this
method depending on how one approximates the non-discriminatory wage structure; see Oaxaca
and Ransom (1994). In line with their recommendation, we use the weighted average of the gender-
speci…c coe¢cients with weights corresponding to shares of each gender out of all employment (for
a similar approach, see, e.g., Macpherson and Hirsh, 1995).
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is presented in Table 4. Summing up the products of average
coe¢cients (column 1 or 3) and X di¤erences (column 2 or 4) for each part of Germany, we …nd
that gender di¤erences in demographic and …rm characteristics account for 7.5 percentage points of
the overall gender wage gap in West Germany. In East Germany, however, we …nd that the gender
di¤erences in productive characteristics actually work to women’s advantage, reducing the gap
which would have been larger if the distribution of X was equalized across men and women. (For
qualitatively similar …ndings from post-communist countries, see Ogloblin, 1999, or Jurajda, 2003.)
In particular, we note that East German women have better educational levels than their male
colleagues and that they are more likely to work in the highly-paid service and public-administration
sectors.
154.3.2. Cross-Sectional E¤ects of Occupational Segregation
Our goal is to learn about the importance of occupational segregation for wages. In columns (2) and
(4) of Table 3, we therefore introduce an additional regressor to our previous speci…cation, namely
the share of female workers in occupation. The demographic and …rm coe¢cients remain stable.
The West German occupational segregation coe¢cients we obtain suggest there is no statistically
signi…cant relationship between the ‘femaleness’ of 3-digit occupations and wages of either men or
women. This is in contrast to the stylized facts of the U.S. literature (see, e.g., Macpherson and
Hirsch, 1995) which …nds negative e¤ects of female occupational concentration on wages of both
genders. Even more striking are the East German estimates in Table 3b: The coe¢cients on the
fraction of females in occupation are both positive and statistically signi…cant.22 This ‡ies in the
face of both the U.S. evidence and the available work from transition countries (Jurajda, 2003).
In Table 5 we assess the sensitivity of our gender segregation estimates to di¤erent speci…cations
and sub-samples. Column (1) of Table 5 shows the coe¢cients on female occupational segregation
from regressions including no other controls. While the West German correlations are not sta-
tistically signi…cant, the East German estimates are positive and much larger compared to the
corresponding parameters of Table 3b. In column (2) we replicate the coe¢cients based on the
preferred speci…cation with all …rm and worker controls from Table 3: Both of the East German
coe¢cients are positive and statistically signi…cant. Baker and Fortin (2001) argue that, because
of human capital externalities, one should also control for average characteristics of co-workers in
an occupation. In column (3) we therefore ask whether higher educational level of workers in the
same occupation (but typically a di¤erent …rm) increases a worker’s wage independent of the own-
education e¤ect.23 Speci…cally, we introduce three additional regressors consisting of the fraction
of an occupation’s workforce with a (i) college degree, (ii) Abitur exam, and (iii) apprenticeship de-
22The male (female) coe¢cient is statistically signi…cant at the 1% (10%) level.
23It is not clear why women would choose to enter occupations with lower average education level, i.e. low-wage
occupations.
16gree. The (unreported) regression coe¢cients corresponding to these additional controls are always
positive and statistically signi…cant. However, their introduction leads to no qualitative change in
the parameters of interest: The East German segregation coe¢cients are smaller, but remain posi-
tive and statistically signi…cant, while the West German coe¢cients are still insigni…cant. Finally,
in columns (4) and (5) we re-estimate the preferred speci…cation for the sub-sample of younger and
older workers. This is motivated by the di¤erential extent of segregation across age groups (Table
2). We …nd that the insigni…cant West German overall coe¢cients result from a combination of
a signi…cant wage penalty to ‘female’ jobs for workers under 30 years of age and a positive, but
statistically weak relationship for older workers. In East Germany, we see that the positive bonus
to ‘female’ jobs comes primarily from older workers.
Next, we check the sensitivity of the OLS estimates to the top coding of IAB wages, which in
principle renders OLS inconsistent. So far, we have ignored the issue of right censoring of wages and
included the observations with top-coded wages in the OLS estimation. Now, we compare the OLS
results to those based on the Censored Least Absolute Deviation (CLAD) estimator proposed by
Powell (1984). CLAD is based on the assumption of zero median of the model error distribution. It
is not a least-squares but a median (quantile) regression and, unlike parametric censored-regression
models (i.e., Tobit), it permits non-normal, heteroscedastic, and asymmetric errors. Column (6) of
Table 5 lists the gender segregation coe¢cients from the median CLAD regressions as well as the
bootstrap standard errors. Comparing the new estimates to the Least-Squares parameters from
column (2) shows little material di¤erence. Furthermore, Appendix Table A-1, which lists the
complete estimated speci…cations from CLAD regressions, suggests that other coe¢cients are also
little a¤ected. We therefore conclude that ignoring right censoring has a negligible quantitative
e¤ect on our parameters, which justi…es the mean wage-gap decompositions based on the OLS
estimates.24
24Note that the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition idea relies on the regression passing through sample means and does
not carry over to the quantile regression case.
17Up to now, we have estimated worker-level regressions, but our parameters of interest were iden-
ti…ed using group-level (occupation-level) variation. We adjusted the variance-covariance matrix
(equation 2) to correct standard errors for the di¤erent data dimensions used in the estimation of
worker- and group-speci…c coe¢cients and to allow for correlation of worker unobservables within
occupations. There is an alternative way of re‡ecting the di¤erent degrees of freedom involved in
estimating the worker-speci…c and occupation-speci…c coe¢cients: One may …rst estimate a regres-
sion with individual-speci…c regressors only and in a second stage regress the occupational means
of residuals or the estimated occupational dummies from the …rst stage on the share of females
in occupation, weighting by the occupation’s size. See Dickens and Ross (1984) for an original
formulation of the approach and Baker and Fortin (2001) for a discussion of the rami…cations of
the one-step and two-step estimators for potential biases from occupation-level omitted variables.
We visualize the estimates from column (2) of Table 5 in Figure 4.2 where we plot for each gender
and each part of Germany in 1995 the occupation-speci…c average residual from wage regressions
with standard controls (but not occupations’ ‘femaleness’) against the occupation-speci…c fraction
of females. The size of each plotted observation re‡ects the number of workers in that occupation-
gender group in the data. The graphs also contain …tted linear weighted-least-squares regression
lines. The estimated parameters from these regressions are in full accord with those based on
worker-level analysis. Again, both West German coe¢cients are small (0.03 for men and -0.04
for women) and statistically insigni…cant, while the East German coe¢cients are both positive
and highly statistically signi…cant (0.08 for both men and women).25 We note that weighting by
25Introducing the controls for the average education in occupation in the second-step regression leads to a dramatic
change in the estimated parameters. In West Germany, both of the segregation coe¢cients are now negative and
statistically signi…cant, while both of the East German parameters are close to zero and insigni…cant. We interpret
these estimates as suggesting that women in East Germany are concentrated in high-skill occupations. (See the next
section for further evidence on this interpretation.) On the other hand, using the occupational dummies from the
…rst-stage (instead of log-wage mean residuals by occupation obtained in absence of occupational controls) leads to
stronger positive coe¢cients in the second stage, especially for East Germany. Note, however, that the inclusion of
occupational dummies in the …rst-stage regression a¤ects the interpretation of the estimated education coe¢cients.
As in the returns-to-education literature, we prefer to…lter out the e¤ect of education independent of the (subsequent)
























































Figure 4.2: Occupation-Level Relationship between Wage Residuals and ‘Femaleness’ in 1995
occupation’s size is important; giving each occupation equal weight would result in a negative e¤ect
for West German men.
4.3.3. Person-Fixed-E¤ect Speci…cations
Our estimates up to now have been based on cross-sectional variation in occupation-speci…c female
concentration. How can we interpret our …ndings thus far? In particular, why do ‘female’ occupa-
tions pay more in East Germany? In searching for an answer we turn to the speci…c labor market
history and institutions in East Germany. The transition from communism in East Germany led
to a dramatic fall in female employment rates while wage levels rapidly rose to near-western levels.
This suggests a marked tendency towards selection of East German women into employment based
19on labor quality. We know that during early pro-market reforms in East Germany low-wage women
were more likely to become jobless while East German men were more likely than women to enter
self-employment (become entrepreneurs) and therefore disappear from our data (Hunt, 2002). If
entry into self-employment is highly correlated with observed and unobserved quality, the East
German men remaining in social-security employment may be of relatively low labor quality. On
the other hand, if low-skill women are not employed, the pool of social-security female employees
may be of relatively high quality.26
Indeed, our Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition in Table 4 suggests that, unlike in West Germany,
the observed labor quality of female employees in East Germany is higher than that of their male
colleagues. If, as one would expect, there is a positive correlation between observable and un-
observable skills of workers (Gibbons and Katz, 1992), East German women may also have bet-
ter unobservables. A positive correlation between the share of women in an occupation and the
occupation-speci…c unobserved labor quality would then lead to the surprising positive coe¢cient
on occupational ‘femaleness’ for females. Furthermore, if the share of women in an occupation
becomes an index of labor quality, then high-skill men may sort themselves into such occupations
(Kremer, 1993), giving rise to a positive e¤ect of occupations’ ‘femaleness’ for males.27
If the percentage of females in an occupation serves as a proxy for skill level, then the ‘femaleness’
coe¢cients should decline with the introduction into a regression of productivity controls. Compar-
ing columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, we see that this is indeed the case. We can shed more light on the
quality sorting hypothesis using the panel dimension of our data. Following Macpherson and Hirsh
(1995), we condition on person-speci…c unobserved labor quality by estimating worker-…xed-e¤ect
26Further, the selection hurdle into employment may be easier for men given that they face higher wages within
jobs (see Table 1).
27One could alternatively explain the positive e¤ect of occupational “femaleness” on male wages as corresponding
to a compensating wage di¤erential for men who would prefer to work with other men, but accept positions in
occupations predominantly sta¤ed with women. This explanation is attractive because we know that in Germany
wages can di¤er according to gender within narrowly de…ned worker groups (Table 1). However, this hypothesis is
less useful in explaining why wages of women working in predominantly ‘female’ occupations are higher compared to
those of women working in ‘male’ occupations.
20regressions.28 These “within” regressions use a subsample of workers employed in both 1992 and
1995 consisting of 30 and 114 thousand employees in East and West Germany respectively.29
It is important to discuss the sources of variation in “ within-person” occupation characteristics,
such as the share of women. Over time, the ‘femaleness’ of one’s occupation can change both for
workers who remain in the same occupation and for those who switch occupations between 1992
and 1995.30 To the extent that they are exogenous to gender segregation, occupation moves provide
an important source of identi…cation for the segregation e¤ect. The IAB panel we use is rich in
that it covers 16 (8) thousand of such occupation moves in West (East) Germany.31
Table 6 presents the results based on the 1992-95 panel subsample. First, we check whether
the cross-sectional estimates of the penalty to ‘female’ occupations from column (2) of Table 5 are
replicated in the panel subsample. We obtain qualitatively equivalent parameters in column (1) of
Table 6 in that the West German occupational ‘femaleness’ coe¢cients remain small and are not
statistically signi…cant. The East German male coe¢cient is also in accord with the cross-sectional
estimate based on all 1995 workers, but the female parameter is now close to zero. In column (2) of
Table 6 we re-estimate the cross-sectional relationship using the smaller group of occupation movers
who provide the strongest source of identi…cation for the “within-person” estimation. Here, we are
able to closely replicate both of the East German occupational coe¢cients as well as the male West
German estimate, but the female West German parameter estimate grows and becomes statistically
signi…cant (but remains within one standard error of the preferred cross-sectional estimate). Overall,
28Using …xed-e¤ect regressions to control for unobserved person-speci…c characteristics is an alternative to estimat-
ing sample-selection models of (female) employment participation. In general, participation decisions undoubtedly
a¤ect both the extent of segregation and the coe¢cients of female wage regressions. The estimation (and identi…cation)
of such models goes beyond the scope of the recent literature on gender segregation.
29The (unreported) cross-sectional parameters from 1992 are very similar to those presented in Table 3 for 1995
(see Prasad, 2000, for evidence on the stability of the German wage structure). Hence, the assumption of constant
coe¢cients across the two years, embedded in the …xed-e¤ect model, is reasonable. At the same time, the 3 year gap
is long enough to allow for changes in wages resulting from changes in occupations to take place.
30The occupation-level time changes of ‘femaleness’ separate from those coming from the observed (sample of)
occupation moves come from the occupation-gender structure of employment in‡ow and out‡ow, which is not captured
in the panel sub-sample.
31In both parts of Germany, about 70% of the occupation movers also changes …rms between 1992 and 1995.
21we conclude that the most important feature of our cross-sectional analysis, namely the positive
‘bonus’ to ‘female’ occupations in East Germany is preserved in the panel subsamples.
Finally, columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 present the estimates of the e¤ect of an occupation’s
‘femaleness’ on wages based on “within-worker” time-change variation.32 These results are not
a¤ected by time-constant di¤erences in worker skills and therefore come closer to a causal e¤ect of
segregation on wages. Using this di¤erent source of variation, we obtain a dramatically di¤erent
set of coe¢cients. Conditioning on both observed and unobserved personal characteristics results
in negative e¤ects of occupational segregation in West Germany and zero e¤ects in East Germany,
completely eliminating its positive cross-sectional occupational segregation coe¢cients.33 This is
fully consistent with our explanation of the positive e¤ects as being driven by sorting on unobserved
labor quality di¤erences.34
Using the notation of equation 1 we are now ready to calculate the contribution of gender




’c ￿m + (1 ¡ ’)c ￿f
¤
; where ’ is the share of males in
full-time social-security employment, b ￿s are the estimated gender-speci…c segregation coe¢cients,
and where the vectors Ps contain the averages of the female-share regressor for each gender.
We perform this calculation twice, in both cases using the cross-sectional mean di¤erences in
P from 1995. First, we use the cross-sectional parameter estimates from column (2) of Table 5.
The calculation suggests that in West Germany gender segregation does not explain any part of
the overall wage gap, while in East Germany it makes female wages 5.5 percentage points higher
than male wages. Second, we use the ‘causal-e¤ect’ panel-data coe¢cients based on occupational
32The clustering of unobservables used to correct standard errors now occurs by occupation pairs across the two
years.
33In all …xed-e¤ect speci…cations, we also tried to include a constant term in order to capture the di¤erent average
growth of wages for East and West Germany, which we would not want to interpret as being caused by di¤erences in
the time change of female share on total employment in each part of Germany. These estimates ask whether wage
growth was faster, relative to average wage growth in the period, in those occupations where female share grew faster.
These results are fully identical to those presented in Table 6, which are based on standard …xed-e¤ect formulas and
in‡ation-adjusted wages.
34On the other hand, this …nding is not consistent with the alternative explanation for the male positive ‘femaleness’
e¤ect based on acompensating wage di¤erential for men whoprefer towork with men, but accept workingwith women.
22movers (column (4) of Table 6). Here, we …nd that in West Germany gender segregation explains
2 percentage points of the overall wage gap, but it gives rise to no gender-related wage di¤erences
in the east part of Germany. Overall, we believe that our panel-data results point to (i) high
unobserved quality of East German female employees leading to a positive sorting on skills across
occupations, and (ii) a very small causal contribution of gender segregation toward explaining the
overall wage gaps in both parts of Germany.
5. Conclusions
This paper sheds light on the size of the gender wage gap, the extent of occupational gender
segregation, and on the e¤ects segregation has on the gender pay di¤erences in East and West
Germany in 1995. The analysis is based on full-time employees only and does not cover civil
servants and the self-employed.
Our analysis uncovers intriguing East-West di¤erences. We …nd a somewhat higher degree of
gender segregation across occupations in East Germany, where women form a larger share of total
social-security employment. Yet, the female structure of employment is very similar in East and
West Germany (the East-West correlation of the share of female employees at the 3-digit occupation
level is 0.91), despite the di¤erent history.
Strikingly, there are no median wage di¤erences between workers of di¤erent genders in East
Germany. Our East German data also imply a very small unconditional mean daily wage gap in
the order of one …fth of the West German gap. In contrast, the mean (median) wage gap in West
Germany is substantial at 30 (22) percent. Despite the di¤erence in the overall wage gaps, we
uncover signi…cant wage gaps within jobs (occupation-…rm cells) in both parts of Germany.
Our regression analysis reconciles these pieces of descriptive evidence: We …nd little support
for the existence of a wage penalty to ‘female’ jobs in West Germany. Occupational segregation
therefore does not explain the greater wage gap in West Germany. The signi…cant within-job wage
23gaps in East Germany do not appear at the aggregate level because more ‘female’ occupations
actually o¤er higher wages, in striking contrast to …ndings from the U.S. as well as from transition
countries.
We suggest a possible interpretation for this …nding based on the unique nature of transition
from central planning in East Germany. German uni…cation brought about the imposition of near-
western wage levels against a background of mass layo¤s. We know that this resulted in a strong
selection of women into employment based on labor quality (Hunt, 2002). Indeed, productive
characteristics of our East German female employees are higher than those of their male colleagues.
If the share of women in an occupation becomes a measure of skill quality, high productivity men
may sort themselves into predominantly ‘female’ occupations.
We explore the implications of this hypothesis in terms of unobservable skills using the longitudi-
nal portion of the data. Following the existing literature, we assume that workers switch occupations
for reasons unrelated to gender segregation, and use the resulting “within-worker” time variation in
‘femaleness’ of occupations to estimate worker-…xed-e¤ect regressions. Conditioning on unobserv-
able labor quality di¤erences, as well as all other time-constant worker characteristics, we …nd no
evidence of a causal e¤ect of occupational segregation on East German wages. This is consistent
with the quality sorting hypothesis, but not with other explanations for the East German ‘bonus’
to ‘female’ jobs.
Our analysis has implications for both gender public policy and the existing literature on occu-
pational gender segregation. First, we suggest that discriminatory crowding of women into low-wage
occupations is not important in Germany. However, we …nd the potential scope for violations of the
equal pay clauses to be signi…cant in both parts of Germany. In West Germany, workplace gender
segregation combines with an uneven distribution of productive characteristics to account for up
to 10 percentage points of the overall 30-percent di¤erence between the mean wages of men and
women, which leaves over two thirds of the gap unexplained. In East Germany, the low overall wage
24gap is in part due to the distribution of both observable and unobservable productive characteristics
favorable to women.35
Second, our evidence implies that the negative cross-sectional relationship between ‘femaleness’
of occupations and wages of both men and women, omnipresent in U.S. and other research, may
not stand in other developed economies. Female employment rates in Germany are low compared
to other developed countries.36 Our …ndings suggest that if mainly highly productive women are
employed (due to, e.g., high wage ‡oors), this may eliminate the typical negative correlation between
the share of females in occupation and wage level in that occupation. Similarly, comparing our
results to …ndings from transition economies (Ogloblin, 1999; Jurajda, 2003) is also suggestive.
Wage levels in most transition economies rose only slowly and wage ‡oors are still low compared
to East Germany. The existing studies on occupational gender segregation in post-communist
countries …nd a signi…cant wage penalty to predominantly ‘female’ occupation classes. We believe
that these casual comparisons motivate future cross-country research linking the size of the wage
penalty to ‘female’ occupations with wage ‡oors and skill structure of female employment. Such
research would be complementary to the within-country longitudinal studies, which control for
unobservable worker skills by relying on the exogeneity of worker occupation moves.
35One possible explanation for the whole of our …ndings is that in Germany (both East and West) discrimination
against women did not take the form of segregation because it was possible to di¤erentiate wages by gender directly
within narrowly de…ned worker groups.
36Around 55% in Germany and over 65% in the U.S.
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27Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the IAB and GSOEP 1995 Worker Samples
a
West East West East
Mean age 39.1 39.6 39.4 40.4
Female (%) 33.1 38.9 33.2 40.1
Education (%)
No apprenticeship, no abitur 13.4 4.4 13.5 4.0
Apprenticeship, no abitur 72.5 78.9 69.7 78.3
Abitur 4.7 3.4 5.4 6.0
College or university 9.4 13.3 11.5 11.7
Firm size < 20 workers (%) 23.2 24.9 19.3 26.2
No. of workers 141,222 40,094 2,034 1,425
No. of firms 84,307 25,349 -- --
Median daily wage
d
153 109 210 150
Median gender wage gap
e
21.8 -0.9 22.2 3.2
Median gap within job cells
f
14.5 6.7 -- --
No. of job cells 5,044 1,349 -- --
Avg. no. of workers per firm in data 10.5 4.8 -- --
bSample based on a cross-section of end-of-year social-security notifications.
c
Sub-sample mimicking the IAB data (a); person-specific cross-sectional weights are used. 
d
GSOEP daily wages approximated by dividing monthly salaries by hours worked. ??? 
eFemale Wage Disadvantage as % of Male Wage (1-wf/wm)
f
A job cell consists of workers in the same firm with the same occupation.
GSOEP
c
a Observations for full-time workers with gross daily wage above 60DM; no civil servants, 




Wages and Gender Wage GapsTable 2: Occupational Segregation by Demographic Characteristics
Education Age group West Germany East Germany Difference West Germany East Germany
30-44 60 69 9 5 2
>44 62 67 4 6 2
<30 68 74 7 19 16
30-44 65 71 6 30 38
>44 67 69 1 24 25
30-44 41 40 -1 5 7
>44 61 43 -19 3 6
Group's Share of Employment (%)
College or university
No apprenticeship, no abitur
Duncan Segregation Index
Apprenticeship, no abiturTable 3a:  Estimated Log-Daily-Wage OLS Regressions for 1995 West Germany
coeff. std.error coeff. std.error coeff. std.error coeff. std.error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction of females in occupation - 0.037 (0.034) - -0.054 (0.07)
Married 0.073 (0.003) 0.073 (0.003) -0.052 (0.006) -0.052 (0.006)
Number of Children -0.015 (0.004) -0.014 (0.004) -0.011 (0.006) -0.012 (0.006)
Age 0.036 (0.003) 0.036 (0.003) 0.038 (0.002) 0.038 (0.002)
Age*Age/100 -0.035 (0.003) -0.035 (0.003) -0.041 (0.002) -0.041 (0.002)
Apprenticeship, No GCE 0.178 (0.015) 0.177 (0.016) 0.183 (0.02) 0.187 (0.021)
Secondary Educ. with GCE 0.306 (0.024) 0.303 (0.027) 0.285 (0.024) 0.287 (0.024)
University and more 0.452 (0.015) 0.451 (0.016) 0.473 (0.038) 0.465 (0.034)
Chemical & Metal 0.156 (0.033) 0.157 (0.033) 0.147 (0.031) 0.149 (0.03)
Textile & Household Goods 0.094 (0.036) 0.090 (0.036) -0.050 (0.044) -0.045 (0.042)
Mining & Quarrying 0.178 (0.034) 0.177 (0.034) 0.139 (0.03) 0.139 (0.029)
Manufacturing 0.179 (0.033) 0.179 (0.033) 0.136 (0.029) 0.138 (0.027)
Utilities 0.252 (0.035) 0.252 (0.035) 0.247 (0.033) 0.256 (0.031)
Construction 0.174 (0.033) 0.177 (0.033) 0.133 (0.031) 0.138 (0.029)
Trade 0.146 (0.039) 0.141 (0.04) 0.070 (0.04) 0.076 (0.038)
Transport 0.107 (0.039) 0.106 (0.038) 0.152 (0.031) 0.155 (0.031)
Banks & Insurance 0.306 (0.033) 0.296 (0.035) 0.308 (0.028) 0.310 (0.027)
Business Services 0.240 (0.033) 0.237 (0.033) 0.239 (0.03) 0.242 (0.028)
Public Administration 0.075 (0.033) 0.069 (0.032) 0.164 (0.026) 0.175 (0.029)
Education 0.098 (0.032) 0.093 (0.033) 0.189 (0.04) 0.204 (0.047)
Health 0.106 (0.035) 0.098 (0.037) 0.103 (0.044) 0.121 (0.049)
Other Services 0.069 (0.046) 0.061 (0.048) 0.083 (0.035) 0.093 (0.034)
Firm employment: 50-99 0.077 (0.006) 0.077 (0.006) 0.106 (0.012) 0.105 (0.011)
                              100-499 0.107 (0.008) 0.106 (0.009) 0.161 (0.014) 0.159 (0.013)
                              over 500 0.155 (0.004) 0.155 (0.01) 0.247 (0.005) 0.245 (0.013)




Note: There are 274 occupations. Agriculture,  elementary education, and firm size below 50 workers are in the base case. 
Standard errors allow for occupational clustering of errors.Table 3b:  Estimated Log-Daily-Wage OLS Regressions for 1995 East Germany
coeff. std.error coeff. std.error coeff. std.error coeff. std.error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction of females in occupation - 0.124 (0.034) - 0.095 (0.056)
Married 0.053 (0.005) 0.054 (0.005) 0.013 (0.005) 0.012 (0.005)
Number of Children -0.007 (0.005) -0.006 (0.005) -0.005 (0.006) -0.005 (0.006)
Age 0.019 (0.002) 0.019 (0.002) 0.028 (0.002) 0.028 (0.002)
Age*Age/100 -0.020 (0.002) -0.021 (0.002) -0.029 (0.003) -0.030 (0.003)
Apprenticeship, No GCE 0.083 (0.018) 0.083 (0.018) 0.166 (0.021) 0.154 (0.022)
Secondary Educ. with GCE 0.295 (0.031) 0.282 (0.033) 0.293 (0.039) 0.283 (0.042)
University and more 0.456 (0.03) 0.438 (0.036) 0.458 (0.041) 0.456 (0.043)
Chemical & Metal 0.160 (0.016) 0.179 (0.018) 0.115 (0.04) 0.108 (0.037)
Textile & Household Goods 0.097 (0.026) 0.096 (0.028) 0.024 (0.03) 0.016 (0.032)
Mining & Quarrying 0.160 (0.019) 0.170 (0.02) 0.165 (0.025) 0.161 (0.026)
Manufacturing 0.206 (0.019) 0.219 (0.02) 0.172 (0.022) 0.162 (0.022)
Utilities 0.346 (0.02) 0.360 (0.022) 0.398 (0.021) 0.382 (0.024)
Construction 0.214 (0.019) 0.235 (0.021) 0.231 (0.016) 0.216 (0.021)
Trade 0.172 (0.034) 0.170 (0.034) 0.198 (0.035) 0.181 (0.038)
Transport 0.221 (0.033) 0.232 (0.029) 0.337 (0.023) 0.320 (0.023)
Banks & Insurance 0.419 (0.031) 0.375 (0.038) 0.509 (0.021) 0.479 (0.023)
Business Services 0.326 (0.022) 0.332 (0.022) 0.363 (0.024) 0.347 (0.027)
Public Administration 0.213 (0.037) 0.196 (0.026) 0.324 (0.026) 0.296 (0.029)
Education 0.235 (0.038) 0.220 (0.032) 0.371 (0.045) 0.347 (0.044)
Health 0.259 (0.024) 0.254 (0.025) 0.303 (0.065) 0.264 (0.06)
Other Services 0.163 (0.041) 0.142 (0.043) 0.217 (0.036) 0.192 (0.036)
Firm employment: 50-99 0.057 (0.009) 0.057 (0.009) 0.068 (0.018) 0.072 (0.017)
                              100-499 0.093 (0.013) 0.091 (0.013) 0.096 (0.024) 0.101 (0.023)
                              over 500 0.148 (0.009) 0.145 (0.017) 0.176 (0.025) 0.180 (0.025)
Constant 3.902 (0.026) 3.842 (0.054) 3.519 (0.034) 3.373 (0.084)
R-squared
Note: There are 274 occupations. Agriculture,  elementary education, and firm size below 50 workers are in the base case. 




0.38 0.39Table 4:  Wage Gap Contribution of Worker and Firm Characteristics in 1995
(1) (2) (1)*(2) (3) (4) (3)*(4)
Married 0.032 0.177 0.006 0.038 -0.045 -0.002
Number of Children -0.014 0.052 -0.001 -0.008 0.069 -0.001
Age 0.037 3.205 0.117 0.022 -0.158 -0.004
Age*Age/100 -0.037 2.405 -0.089 -0.024 -0.055 0.001
Apprenticeship, No GCE 0.179 -0.002 0.000 0.114 0.003 0.000
Secondary Educ. with GCE 0.299 -0.025 -0.007 0.293 -0.017 -0.005
University and more 0.459 0.050 0.023 0.451 -0.010 -0.005
Chemical & Metal 0.153 0.043 0.007 0.141 0.060 0.008
Textile & Household Goods 0.046 -0.016 -0.001 0.067 -0.009 -0.001
Mining & Quarrying 0.165 0.052 0.009 0.161 0.033 0.005
Manufacturing 0.165 0.108 0.018 0.191 0.054 0.010
Utilities 0.251 0.020 0.005 0.362 0.013 0.005
Construction 0.160 0.083 0.013 0.220 0.205 0.045
Trade 0.121 -0.048 -0.006 0.181 0.005 0.001
Transport 0.122 0.029 0.004 0.265 0.033 0.009
Banks & Insurance 0.307 -0.025 -0.008 0.451 -0.030 -0.014
Business Services 0.240 -0.002 0.000 0.338 -0.005 -0.002
Public Administration 0.104 -0.042 -0.004 0.255 -0.180 -0.046
Education 0.128 -0.026 -0.003 0.288 -0.045 -0.013
Health 0.105 -0.100 -0.011 0.273 -0.092 -0.025
Other Services 0.073 -0.080 -0.006 0.182 -0.055 -0.010
Firm employment: 50-99 0.087 0.005 0.000 0.061 0.028 0.002
                              100-499 0.125 0.003 0.000 0.093 -0.034 -0.003
                              over 500 0.185 0.055 0.010 0.158 -0.104 -0.017
Total contribution 0.075 -0.058














West GermanyTable 5: Occupational Gender Composition Coefficients from Cross-Sectional Specifications
coeff. std.error coeff. std.error coeff. std.error coeff. std.error coeff. std.error coeff. std.error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Men 0.057 (0.065) 0.037 (0.034) -0.027 (0.026) -0.055 (0.03) 0.079 (0.052) 0.043 (0.005)
Women -0.138 (0.105) -0.054 (0.07) -0.002 (0.052) -0.090 (0.049) 0.008 (0.097) -0.049 (0.009)
Men 0.295 (0.063) 0.124 (0.034) 0.057 (0.029) 0.05 (0.03) 0.167 (0.044) 0.097 (0.012)




Table 6: Occupational Gender Composition Coefficients from the 1992-1995 Panel Sub-Sample
coeff. std.error coeff. std.error coeff. std.error coeff. std.error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men 0.057 (0.036) 0.070 (0.045) -0.034 (0.014) -0.035 (0.014)
Women -0.050 (0.073) -0.128 (0.073) -0.091 (0.023) -0.078 (0.022)
Men 0.152 (0.032) 0.164 (0.037) -0.014 (0.031) 0.008 (0.025)





all workers all workers
Least Squares Least Squares Least Squares Least Squares
Yes Yes
Note: For a list of standard controls see Table 3. The panel subsample is based on workers employed in both 1992 and 
1995. Standard errors allow for occupational clustering of unboservables; in columns (3) and (4) the clusters correspond to 
pairs of occupations across the two years.
Note: For a list of standard controls see Table 3. Least-Squares standard errors allow for occupational clustering of unobservables. 









all workers occupation movers
West Germany
East Germany
Least Squares Least Squares Person Fixed Effect Person Fixed Effect
Yes Yes Yes Yes
all workers occupation moversTable A-1:  Coefficient Estimates from CLAD Regressions
Men Women Men Women
Female fraction in occ. 0.043 -0.049 0.097 0.109
Married 0.077 -0.011 0.054 0.020
Number of Children -0.021 -0.011 -0.011 -0.005
Age 0.036 0.042 0.019 0.034
Age*Age/100 -0.034 -0.044 -0.020 -0.037
Apprent., no GCE 0.186 0.198 0.089 0.186
Secondary Educ. GCE 0.342 0.266 0.264 0.273
University and more 0.566 0.545 0.507 0.497
Chemical & Metal 0.130 -0.004 0.264 0.095
Textile & Household 0.089 -0.180 0.199 0.059
Mining & Quarrying 0.157 0.005 0.225 0.233
Manufacturing 0.164 -0.001 0.341 0.304
Utilities 0.243 0.074 0.432 0.480
Construction 0.178 0.013 0.328 0.247
Trade 0.110 -0.103 0.215 0.219
Transport 0.075 -0.018 0.351 0.420
Banks & Insurance 0.300 0.151 0.383 0.510
Business Services 0.267 0.097 0.409 0.535
Public Administration -0.010 -0.051 0.277 0.364
Education -0.008 -0.042 0.294 0.409
Health 0.048 -0.009 0.392 0.430
Other Services 0.066 0.000 0.316 0.344
Firm empl.: 50-99 0.030 0.018 0.024 -0.009
                   100-499 0.068 0.068 0.069 0.026
                   over 500 0.127 0.120 0.117 0.091
Constant 3.847 3.814 3.831 3.277
East Germany West Germany